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Abstract 
 
The paper provides the first published evidence for a ‘U’ shaped relationship between 
country ‘league-table’ ranking based on the Human Development Index (HDI) and 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and media reporting. The results suggest that the 
Extremity Hypothesis proposed by Heath (1996) applies to such data rather than the 
alternative of the Centrality Hypothesis. In the Extremity Hypothesis people are more likely 
to transmit information regarding extremes, perhaps because people value ‘surprisingness’ or 
think that others do so, and the inevitable polarity of league-tables would appear to invite 
greater attention on those countries that rank high and low. This is an important finding as it 
suggests that countries at these extremes could act as exemplars. However, this is not to say 
that at more regional scales the media may pick-up on differences between ‘peer group’ 
countries ranked towards the middle of the league-table. Much more attention needs to be 
given by researchers to the use of indicators and indices and what helps to influence this, 
especially as it would help inform further development of existing indicators/indices and the 
creation of new ones.  
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Introduction 
 
Much effort has been placed into the development and promotion of indicators and indices 
(where an index is an amalgam of indicators) as tools to help achieve the goal of sustainable 
development (Pissourios, 2013), and this is likely to accelerate with the recent (2016) 
publication of the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs; Hák et al., 2016) and the 
growing interest in the ‘planetary boundaries’ concept (Steffen et al., 2015). The Earth 
Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 was arguably a significant catalyst for this effort to 
create and promote sustainable development indicators but even prior to that date there had 
much emphasis on indices such as the Human Development Index (HDI) as well as more 
specialised indicators and indices such as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Shannon-
Wiener Index of Biodiversity (H) in the realms of economics and ecology respectively. The 
idea behind all of these is to try and capture complex ideas and indeed datasets into single 
values that can readily be grasped and hence utilised by groups including decision makers 
(Morse, 2015). The ‘simplifying’ assumption behind all indicators and indices has been 
criticised by some as resulting in a low utility for decision making (Hinkel, 2011; Preston et 
al., 2011) in an instrumental sense whereby they are used to inform decisions and measure 
the impacts of those decisions (Rinne et al., 2013). But it has also been argued that they may 
have some value in terms of communication and thus can help bring about an indirect 
influence on decision-makers. However, there are limitations here. While the history of 
economic indicators such as the GDP suggests influences that stretch back to the 18th century 
(Coyle, 2014) it can be said that they were essentially born out of the maelstrom of the 
recession (‘Great Depression’) in the 1930s with the work of Simon Kuznets in the USA and 
Colin Clark in the UK and Australia which aimed to establish systems of national accounting 
that allowed for an assessment of change over time and especially for Clark the ability to 
make comparisons between countries.  Clark (1940) produced one of the first published 
rankings (league table format) of countries based upon income/capita where income had been 
adjusted for local purchasing power (Table 1). The USA and Canada came top of the table 
while China and the developing world (notably Africa and Asia) dominated the bottom. 
Indeed, it is perhaps rather sobering to consider how this table developed in the late 1930s, 
nearly 80 years ago at the time of writing, has a broad resemblance to contemporary league 
tables of GDP/capita adjusted for purchasing power. 
  
<Table 1 near here> 
 GDP as a measure of economic activity was intended to be used by managers of the economy 
and was not primarily intended as a means of communicating complex economic ideas to a 
non-specialist audience, and indeed much confusion can arise amongst a lay audience as to 
what the GDP is and how it is calculated. This is understandable, especially as the calculation 
of the GDP is methodologically challenging and founded upon a number of key assumptions 
that have changed over time (van den Bergh, 2009), but the GDP is nonetheless widely 
reported by groups such as the media as a measure of the economic prowess of a country. But 
the very meaning of what GDP represents can be open to multiple interpretations; something 
that can be surprising to economists. For example, in a recent article following the decision in 
June 2016 of the UK to leave the European Union (so-called ‘Brexit’), Anand Menon (2016) 
describes a town hall meeting in Newcastle, a city in the north east of England, where he 
raised the possibility that ‘Brexit’ would reduce the country’s GDP. The response from one 
member of the audience was bluntly dismissive of such a warning - “That’s your bloody 
GDP…… not ours”; a response that clearly surprised the author but perhaps is symptomatic 
of the GDP representing an economic activity that was simply not visible or experienced by 
the member of the audience.     
 
The HDI, on the other hand, represents a conscious attempt by its founding organisation, 
namely the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), to create an index designed to 
capture what the UNDP regarded as important within their vision of human development and 
convey that to a broad group of ‘index-consumers’, including the media, meant to use that 
information to bring about positive change (Stanton, 2007). Therefore, for the UNDP ‘use’ of 
the HDI was founded on its ability to spur and guide decision-makers to improve human 
development in their jurisdiction. The idea behind the HDI, first published in the 1990 
Human Development Report (HDR), was to provide an alternative to what the UNDP saw as 
a dominance of economic indicators such as the GDP within an international development 
discourse dominated by institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (Stanton, 2007). That is certainly not to say that social indicators were ignored by the 
World Bank up to that time. The World Bank began reporting a series of development 
indicators in its first ‘World Development Report’ (WDR) of 1978, and amongst the 
economic indicators that dominated the tables in this report were two tables referred to as 
“social indicators” that “provide some information on health conditions and on the 
availability of health and education services” (page 73). Between 1987 and 1996 the World 
Bank published a series of annual ‘Social Indicators of Development’ (SID) reports that 
included a wider array of social indicators than those seen in the WDR of 1978. But even so, 
the UNDP in the later 1980s thought that a new index was required to help shift the balance 
more firmly towards human development while at the same time acknowledging the 
importance of economics in development (Stanton, 2007). Hence, from the very start, the 
HDI was (and still is) a tool whose raison d’etre was to catalyse human development, and 
this is facilitated via a ‘league table’ approach similar to Table 1 but where countries are 
ranked in terms of the value of their HDI rather than economic prowess. The best performing 
countries (higher HDI = better human development) are at the top of the table and worst 
performers (lower HDI = poorer human development) are at the bottom of the table. The 
‘league table’ style of presentation is meant to provide a ‘name and shame’ spur to human 
development as the rankings are meant to be picked up by the media, and through them the 
public, non-government organisations, pressure groups, aid agencies etc. and ultimately 
provide pressure upon decision-makers to bring about positive change (Morse, 2015). While 
the HDI may be amongst the better known of a group of indices designed to reach a broad 
audience there are many others. Another example is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
designed and promoted by a non-governmental pressure group called Transparency 
International (TI) as of the mid-1990s.  The CPI addresses a more focussed issue (corruption) 
than does the HDI and the methodologies are very different, but the ‘league table’ style of 
presentation and the desire to reach out to a broader and non-technical audience, presumably 
in this case within the public and the private sectors, is the same. In both cases the desire is to 
use the index to help promote positive change, and the league table style of ranking countries 
by performance is a means to help bring that about. 
 
Given that the HDI and CPI are intended, at least in part, to be picked up and reported by 
groups such as the media, previous research has explored the extent to which this has 
happened in the UK and globally and identified differences between the indices in the extent 
to which they are reported (Morse, 2013, 2016). Perhaps surprisingly given that the HDI was 
first published in 1990 and the CPI in 1995 there is still a lack of research focussed on the use 
of these indices by intended ‘users’; the extent to which they are used and what those uses 
may be. There are few studies in this area and much of the research emphasis with indicators 
and indices arguably remains highly focussed on their more technical aspects such as their 
design. One interesting dimension that should be considered is how the media reporting of 
indicators and indices may vary depending upon a country’s place within the published 
league tables. The media are an important group for influencing decision-makers, although 
this influence is in both directions of course, and given that indicators and indices are tools 
that aid with communication of what can be complex concepts then one would expect them to 
be used by the media (Frønes, 2007; Saltelli, 2007).  
 
However, there is little in the way of theory to draw from here, itself a reflection of how 
under-developed the indicator/index use literature is at present, but one possibility is that 
media reporting is greater for countries at the two ends of the league table with those towards 
the middle receiving less coverage. This is entirely founded on the notion that the media will 
focus on good and bad news stories represented by those extreme ranks. At one end of that 
scale there is certainly an extensive literature which explores media bias towards the 
reporting of bad news (Haskins and Miller, 1984; Garz, 2014), including analyses which 
suggest how bad news is more economically valuable for media outlets (McCluskey et al., 
2015). There are various explanations for such ‘bad news bias’ in a variety of sectors 
including the reporting of economic trends (Kollmeyer, 2004). For example, Soroka (2006) 
suggest that ‘Prospect Theory’ in economics may play a role here as people, including 
journalists, care about losses more than gains of an equal magnitude and this becomes 
reflected in a tendency towards reporting bad news. Hence: 
 
“Journalists will thus regard negative information as more important, not just 
based on their own (asymmetric) interests, but also on the (asymmetric) interests 
of their news-consuming audience. Observed trends in media content are, in this 
view, a product of asymmetric reactions to information at the individual level.” 
(Soroka, 2006; page 374) 
 
Research has shown that this tendency to spread bad news also applies to social media such 
as Twitter (Naveed et al., 2011). Aday (2010; page 146) makes the following point: 
 
“Indeed, one reason for the persistence of a negativity bias across news genres 
can be traced to the fact that conflict is what Herbert Gans (1980) found to be a 
fundamental news norm, something that journalists look for in defining a story as 
newsworthy. ‘‘Good news’’ is generally seen as less interesting to viewers than 
‘‘bad news,’’ especially on television.” 
 
Such a tendency towards “negativity bias” could in turn have a significant influence on public 
opinion and behaviour (Garz, 2014) and sense-framing of the realities can become a complex 
interplay between events, those seeking to create a dominant interpretation of those events 
and how the media portrays all of this (Lewis et al., 2008). The media can also pick up on 
representations of claimed ‘success’ as well as the bad news of failure. For example, 
Blackmore and Thomson (2004) explore how the discourse of successful schools in the UK 
and Australia, where success may be regarded through the lens of a narrow set of 
performance indicators, tends to crystallise around the heads of those schools; a process the 
authors call ‘media-tion’. Governments and schools play into this portrayal of school 
‘success’ and “in all this, heads have themselves become both ‘celebrities’ and ‘saviours’, but 
they are also equally open to losing out badly when things get really tough” (Blackmore and 
Thomson, 2004; page 316). The use of league tables in a variety of contexts, including the 
ranking of educational institutions, and how these are created and represented within the 
media has also long been a matter for discussion (Brown, 2006). University league tables, for 
example, are often claimed to help facilitate student choice by their creators and have been 
said to increase the number of applications to those institutions ranked high (Sauder and 
Lancaster, 2006) but critics such as Brown (2006; page 35) makes the rather intriguing point 
that: 
 
“perhaps the greatest irony of all is the fact that whilst the evidence that league 
tables have a significant influence on student choice is limited, there is some 
evidence to the effect that institutions, and particularly Vice-Chancellors, pay a 
great deal of attention to them.” 
 
But is this use of league tables by Vice Chancellors really such an irony? If the league table is 
having an impact on one important group (Vice Chancellors) with power (and at the time of 
writing his critique Brown was a Vice Chancellor of a UK university) then presumably the 
creators of the league tables can still regard this as an important contribution.  
 
There have been attempts to formalise media reporting in terms of how it reacts to perceived 
good and bad news. Heath (1996; page 81) provides a set of models of media reporting based 
upon two dimensions: 
 
(1) the valence of the news, whether the news is ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘bad’’;  
(2) the extremity of the news, how good or bad the news is. 
 
For the ‘extremity’ of news dimension Heath (1996) suggested that two models may be 
possible: 
 
1. Centrality hypothesis. Here people are more likely to transmit moderate information 
over more extreme information, perhaps because they are unwilling to believe the 
extremes. 
2. Extremity hypothesis. Here people are more likely to transmit information regarding 
extremes, perhaps because people value ‘surprisingness’ or think that others do so.   
 
These hypotheses are represented by the graphs in Figure 1. Figure 1a is what one would 
expect to see with the Centrality hypothesis, with greater media reporting of news not 
perceived as being at the extremes, and Figure 1b the expectation of the Extremity hypothesis 
where the emphasis tends to be towards the good and bad news. But which of these is the 
case in reality? Following a number of analyses of media reporting Heath (1996) suggests 
that in terms of ‘valency’ there is a tendency to pass along bad news more than good news 
which confirmed the analyses of Haskins and Miller (1984) and subsequently reinforced by 
Soroka (2006), Garz (2014) and others. In terms of the ‘extremity’ dimension Heath (1996) 
suggests that there is a tendency towards “central rather than extreme news” as represented 
by the Centrality hypothesis. However, is this always the case? After all, the league table 
format can arguably invite a readership to concentrate their attention more towards the top 
and bottom of the table (good and bad news respectively) and in the research reported here it 
was assumed that with regard to indicator/index league tables the extremity hypothesis is 
more likely to be the case. If true, then the polarisation of media attention towards the top and 
bottom end of league tables based on indicators/indices would have important repercussions 
as media reporting of the tables can reasonably be regarded as a significant source of 
information and hence influence for the public and indeed decision makers (Morse, 2013).  
 
The objective of the research reported here was to test whether indicator/index-based league 
tables, notably those of the HDI and CPI, do follow the Extremity Hypothesis in terms of 
media reporting. In effect the country league tables were employed to address the debate on 
centrality and extremity reporting. It should be noted that the paper makes no attempt to 
critique the basis of the HDI or the CPI and neither does it seek to critique the methods of 
calculation and assumptions that were employed. Instead the analysis makes use of the 
published league tables of the indices as it is the published tables that would be available to 
the media each year and thus be the basis for their subsequent reporting.   
 
<Figure 1 near here> 
 
 
 
HDI and CPI 
 
Since its origin in the late 1980s, and first publication in 1990, the HDI has comprised three 
components encompassing health, education and income (Morse, 2014). These are measured 
as: 
 
1. Life expectancy as a proxy indicator for health care and living conditions. 
2. Adult literacy combined with years of schooling or enrolment in primary, secondary 
and tertiary education. 
3. Real GDP/capita ($ PPP) as a proxy indicator for disposable income. 
 
The choice of these three as components for the HDI is not in itself all that surprising, they 
can be found in many lists of development indicators including those of the World Bank from 
1978, but their selection does pose an immediate problem in that the units by which they are 
measured are obviously different; life expectancy is measured as years, education typically as 
a percentage and real GDP/capita in dollars (adjusted for PPP). The three components of the 
HDI have had a more-or-less equal weighting since inception, although the journey from raw 
data to the HDI has varied somewhat since 1990 (Morse, 2014). It is not necessary here to go 
into the details of the calculation of the HDI and assumptions that were made by its creators 
each year, but suffice it to say that changes in methodology have impacted upon league table 
rankings for the countries. Thus a country may find itself moving up or down the league table 
between successive years not because of any fundamental change to the three components but 
because of the ways in which they have been aggregated and assumptions that rest behind 
this (Morse, 2014). 
  
The CPI was first published in 1995, and unlike the HDI the CPI is based on people’s 
perception of corruption. It is not a direct measure of the degree of corruption within a 
country but how it is perceived by those who are most likely to encounter it. For obvious 
reasons the measurement of corruption raises many challenges (Heywood and Rose, 2014), 
hence there tends to be a reliance on measuring the perception of corruption. The CPI is an 
index of indices in the sense that it utilises a number of published indices of corruption that 
are published each year and published by bodies such as the World Economic Forum, the 
World Bank, Freedom House and Pricewaterhouse Cooper. In essence the various indices of 
corruption are based on surveys of those most likely to experience it, such as international 
business people. The calculation of the CPI is complex and changes in methodology both at 
the level of the component indices and the CPI can also alter league table ranking. Unlike the 
HDI, countries at the top of the CPI league table are those that are deemed to be less corrupt 
while those at the bottom are most corrupt.  
 
Both the HDI and CPI have certainly had their critics over the years. For example, some 
critiques of the CPI can be found in de Maria (2008) and Warren and Laufer (2009). For the 
CPI the reliance on surveys designed to assess the perceptions of business people and others 
who may not necessarily be resident in the countries they are asked to comment on results in 
a picture of corruption that may not necessarily match reported experiences (Donchev and 
Ujhelyi, 2014), especially of those who live in those countries including the poorest who may 
suffer the most from corruption.  In the case of the HDI some early critiques can be found in 
Kelly (1991), Srinivasan (1994), Streeten (1994),  Noorbakhsh (1998),  Sagar and Najam 
(1999) and Lüchters and Menkhoff (2000). For the HDI the critiques have largely centred 
around the use of just three components, with no dimension covering, for example, 
environmental impacts (Neumayer, 2001), and the assumptions over their relative weighting. 
The UNDP has consistently argued that including more elements to the HDI would make it 
more complex and less transparent (see, for example, the discussion in the UNDP HDR, 
1994; page 91). Critiques over the weighting of the three components have continued ever 
since the first HDI was published in 1990 and while the UNDP have made changes it is fair 
to say that the issue remains deeply contested (see for example Ravallion, 2012). There are 
also distributional issues that may be hidden by the device of having a single value of the 
HDI for a country. A country may have a high value for GDP, and this in turn can ‘push’ the 
HDI higher, but there can be many within society who will simply not recognise this 
‘wealth’; as witnessed by the point made above by Menon (2016).   
 While the HDI has no component that assesses corruption or indeed good governance, these 
are clearly related as one can readily imagine that corruption acts as brake which limits 
human development within a country. Various studies have explored this relationship, and it 
has been well reported over some years that values of the HDI and CPI do have a statistically 
significant relationship (Ortega et al., 2014, 2016); suggesting that better human development 
is achieved when there are lower levels of corruption, or conversely that lower levels of 
corruption are found in countries with higher levels of human development. However, the 
strength of the relationship with CPI has been known to vary between the three components 
of the HDI.  
 
 
Methodology 
 
The research had a number of stages. First it was necessary to standardise the published 
country ranks to allow for the different number of countries included each year from 1995 
onwards. Table 2 shows the number of countries included in the published league tables for 
the HDI and CPI from 1995 to 2014. Country rank was adjusted by standardising the 
published league table ranking provided by the UNDP and Transparency International so that 
the highest ranked country had a score of 1 and the lowest ranked country had a score of 2; 
although it should be noted that low values for the adjusted rank based on the HDI and CPI 
equate to higher human development and less corruption respectively.  
 
Adjusted rank = (mean rank – country rank)/standard deviation 
 
The mean and standard deviation of the ranks were based on these league tables and adjusted 
ranks for the HDI were calculated for the years 1995 to 2014 although for the years 2007 and 
2008 just one HDI was published. For the CPI the adjusted ranks were calculated for the 
years 1995 to 2014. All of the countries included in the HDI and CPI league tables over those 
years were included in the analysis, even if a country (e.g. Yugoslavia) does not exist at the 
time of writing. No attempt was made to select a sub-set of countries as it was deemed 
important to work with the league tables as they were published, as it is the published tables 
that would be accessible to the media and thus would potentially influence reporting by the 
media.   
<Table 2 near here> 
 
The second stage involved an assessment of the degree of linkage between adjusted league 
table ranks of the HDI and CPI and the degree of media reporting of the indices. Correlation 
coefficients of both the HDI and CPI ranks for countries across years suggest that there is a 
high degree of correlation between years. Thus the pattern of ranks across countries in any 
one year is highly correlated with the pattern in other years, suggesting a relative degree of 
stability in country rankings over time. This is not all that surprising as even a cursory glance 
at the HDI and CPI league tables from 1995 onwards suggests that the same countries tend to 
dominate the top and bottom of the league tables albeit with some fluctuation in precise rank. 
The data ranks were formally tested for multicollinearity by calculating Variance Inflation 
Factors (VIF) of index rank for countries across years (independent variables) with total 
number of media articles as the dependent variable and they were very high (typically in the 
hundreds).  
 
In order to avoid problems arising from multicollinearity in regression analysis, it was 
decided to use Principal Components Regression (PCR). In PCR, the dependent variable (in 
this case number of media articles) is not directly regressed on the independent variables 
(HDI and CPI) but instead is regressed on principal components (PCs) derived from the 
independent variables. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is probably the most commonly 
employed multivariate technique in statistical analysis. Its purpose is to extract important 
information from a dataset of inter-related variables. The first Principal Component (1st PC) 
accounts for the largest degree of variance in the dataset with subsequent PCs (2nd, 3rd etc.) 
accounting for the highest degree of variance possible under the key constraint that they have 
to be orthogonal to the preceding components.  PCR is very effective in dealing with issues 
of multicollinearity but is not the only technique that could have been applied to deal with 
this. Other options that handle multicollinearity while allowing all the explanatory variables 
to be retained are Partial Least Squares Regression (PLSR) and Ridge Regression (Tikhonov 
regularization).  PLSR reduces the full set of predictors to a smaller set of uncorrelated 
components and performs least squares regression on them rather than the original data. 
However, interpretation of the results based on components can be challenging in PLSR and 
there is a lack of model test statistics. Ridge regression is also a popular approach but is also 
controversial as the solution is found by adding rows of data to the original data matrix to 
disrupt the high correlations between them (Myers, 1990). PCR was selected above these 
options as all that was being looked for was a quadratic relationship that suggested an 
increase/decrease in media reporting for countries at the top and the bottom of the league 
tables. Hence it was only necessary to reduce the dataset to a few principal components.  
 
For the PCR, the time-series data for the HDI and CPI across countries were reduced by 
using PCA and the results are shown in Table 3 (HDI) and Table 4 (CPI). The principal 
component coefficients in Tables 3 and 4 were used to produce scores for the 1st and 2nd PCs 
for each country. As the 1st and 2nd PCs for the HDI accounted for 93% of the variation and 
for the CPI these PCs accounted for 82% of the variation it was decided in the research 
reported here to only work with the 1st and 2nd PCs. While useful as a means for exploring a 
quadratic relationship between the two indices and article counts, this does result in some 
limited shrinkage of the variation in the dataset as only the first two PCs were selected; this is 
an issue with the use of PCR to address multicollinearity and is a reason why some prefer 
Ridge Regression. However, here there are high levels of variation in the index rank dataset 
covered by the first and second PCs.  
 
<Tables 3 and 4 near here> 
 
The level of media reporting for the two indices over the period 1995 to 2014 was found by 
determining the number of articles reporting the HDI and CPI by country over the period 1st 
January 1995 and 31st December 2014 using the subscription-based Nexis database and 
search tools available via LexisNexis (internationalsales.lexisnexis.com/english-
is/home.page). The sources selected in the Nexis database were ‘All news, All languages’. 
For each year the Nexis database was used to return the number of articles referring to HDI 
or the CPI and each country at least once in the article. Thus the search terms were: 
 
 Country AND ‘Human Development Index’ 
 Country AND ‘Corruption Perception Index’  
 
The outputs from the database search were the number of articles published across the globe 
(after adjustment for duplication) that have the respective search term. For example, the 
search term ALGERIA AND ‘HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX’ will return all of the 
media reports published over the period 1/1/1995 and 31/12/2014 no matter where they were 
published. However, while the media reports included in the search span the globe it should 
be noted that no adjustment was made to allow for the extent of readership. Also, it should be 
noted that even in non-English publications an index is often reported using its English name, 
but this may not always be the case and hence the search returns using the Nexis database are 
likely to be an underestimation. In effect the use of the English names for the two indices will 
have the effect of picking up a segment of the media reports, and reports that solely employ, 
for example, the French term of the HDI (l'indice du développement humain) would not be 
included. Hence, the use of total counts of media reports over the 1995 to 2014 period is 
admittedly a somewhat basic measure by which to gauge media interest but it does have the 
significant advantage of simplicity.  
 
The final stage of the research involved the regressing of HDI and CPI principal component 
scores for each country (computed from the adjusted ranks) on the total number of media 
reports for the country that mention the HDI and CPI at least once. For example, the HDI 
score for each country in the dataset was derived using the PC1 coefficients in Table 3 as 
follows: 
𝑃𝐶1 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝐻𝐷𝐼 =  ∑  𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐻𝐷𝐼 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 𝑋 𝑃𝐶1𝑖
𝑖=2014
𝑖−1995
 
 
The calculation was repeated for the PC2 coefficients of the HDI and for the CPI dataset. 
Following the Extremity hypothesis of Heath (1996) it was hypothesised that countries at the 
extremes of the ranks (low and high) would be more likely to attract media attention than 
countries that are middle-ranked. Hence one would expect to see a ‘U’ shaped curve (Figure 
1a) with media reporting as the dependent variable and rank (based on the HDI and CPI) as 
independent variables. In this instance the use of PCR allowed for the selection of the 1st and 
2nd PCs which allowed for the testing of a quadratic relationship between scores and article 
counts rather than explore the contribution of each year. The quadratic models tested were as 
follows: 
 
Total article count (HDI) = intercept + 1st PC score + 1st PC2 score 
Total article count (HDI) = intercept + 2nd PC score + 2nd PC2 score 
Total article count (CPI) = intercept + 1st PC score + 1st PC2 score 
Total article count (CPI) = intercept + 2nd PC score + 2nd PC2 score 
Results 
 The total article count achieved for each country between 1995 and 2014 are presented in 
Table 5 along with the mean and standard deviations of the adjusted ranks for that country 
over that same period. 
 
<Table 5 near here> 
 
Plots of the HDI and CPI 1st and 2nd PCs against the average rank of the indices over the time 
periods are shown in Figure 2. Higher values for the HDI 1st PC and lower values for the HDI 
2nd PC tend to equate to a higher HDI rank (higher human development). For the CPI, higher 
values for the PC1 and lower values for the PC2 tend to equate to higher ranks of the CPI 
(lower corruption).   
 
To check whether the use of PCA based on ranks, rather than the values of the indices, 
provided a reliable measure that could be used to explore a relationship with media reporting 
it was necessary to test whether the 1st and 2nd PCs of the HDI and CPI rank were related to 
each other. Plots of the 1st and 2nd PC scores of the HDI (dependent variables) and CPI 
(independent variables) are shown in Figure 3 along with the results of regressions based 
upon a quadratic model. Coefficients of determination (R2) for all four of the regressions are 
between 47 and 54% and all four of the models are statistically significant at P<0.001. All the 
models come to the same conclusion; namely that high human development equates to low 
corruption and vice versa. As noted earlier, this is a well- reported conclusion in previous 
studies using values for the HDI and CPI (rather than rank) and provides a significant degree 
of confidence that that HDI and CPI PC scores based upon rank are capturing the same 
phenomenon.  
 
Plots of the HDI and CPI 1st and 2nd PC scores against the number of media reports recorded 
from the Nexis database are shown in Figure 4 along with the results of fitting a quadratic 
regression model. The latter were the best fit models for these data distributions, although the 
coefficients of determination were not that high (all less than 20%). Even so, three of the 
models were statistically significant at P<0.001 while one was almost statistically significant 
(P=0.051). This suggests that for both the HDI and the CPI there is indeed a ‘U’ shaped 
(quadratic) relationship between league table position of a country and the number of media 
reports as suggested by the Extremity Hypothesis of Figure 1b.  
 <Figures 2, 3 and 4> 
 
 
Discussion 
 
This paper provides the first published evidence for a ‘U’ shaped relationship between media 
interest and league table rank based on both the HDI and CPI. It would appear that media 
interest is indeed greatest for countries at the low and upper end of the league tables, and is 
less for countries that are ranked towards the middle of the league table. This follows an 
expected pattern of the media picking up on both bad and good news, represented by 
countries ranked at the bottom and top of the HDI and CPI league tables, although it is 
important to note that while the reporting for countries towards the middle of the league 
tables tends to be less there is much variation in the data (as represented by the relative low 
values for R2) and some mid-ranked countries do attract a great deal of media attention. 
Nonetheless the research does provide the first evidence for the Extremity Hypothesis 
developed by Heath (1996) applied here to the media reporting of two prominent indices. 
While Heath (1996) suggested that his Centrality Hypothesis is more likely, the polarity of 
league tables with clear top and bottom ranked countries arguably lends itself to an emphasis 
on those extremes as this is where the ’news’ (good and bad) is to be found.  
 
Given that the use of the league table format by the creators of the HDI and the CPI, and 
indeed various other indices, is intended to promote comparison and a ‘naming and shaming’ 
of those countries that do poorly then perhaps this greater media attention at the extremes is 
desirable. Media focus on those countries that do well (good human development; low 
corruption) and badly (poor human development; high corruption) can provide exemplars of 
what to do and indeed what not to do in terms of governance. However, while the results 
highlight the significance of league table ranking for attraction by the media it should be 
noted that the article counts have been taken from sources across the globe.  While a middle-
ranked country may attract less attention on global scales it is quite likely that it would attract 
a significant degree of attention at national or perhaps regional scales, and this may have an 
influence on public perception and indeed on politicians and decision makers. Thus care does 
need to be taken in assuming that global media reporting as assessed here is directly related to 
influence upon decision makers and others. While the assumption may seem reasonable, 
further work is required to explore to what extent, if any, media reporting of indices has an 
influence on decision makers as intended by the creators of the HDI and CPI.  
 
Nonetheless the results suggest that the use of league tables to present the HDI and CPI does 
help attract media attention especially for those countries at the extremes of the ranking. 
While the use of the league table format has been criticised given that it can over-simplify 
what are in effect very complex topics such as human development and corruption or indeed 
education (Brown, 2006) it is nonetheless a powerful vehicle for highlighting differences 
between countries and is widely employed for a variety of indices (Pissourios, 2013) such as 
the Ecological Footprint (EF) and Environmental Performance Index (EPI)  The HDI is a 
very simplified index in the sense that it only has three elements and the CPI is based on 
perception of corruption derived from a rather specific group rather than being an empirical 
measure (Donchev and Ujhelyi, 2014), and there is a danger that these nuances may well be 
lost within media reports that focus on ranks based on the indices.   
   
There is much scope for further research in terms of the ‘use’ of indicators and indices, 
including by group such as the media. For example, it is important to know the types of 
journalistic pieces (editorials, news, opinion pieces etc.) that report indices such as the HDI 
and CPI and the use of content analysis to explore the ways in which the indices are used 
within those pieces. For example, there may be two types of article: 
 
1. Those that focus on the indices. For example, articles that discuss the press 
release of the latest version of an index and any trends that may be evident.  
2.  The use of indices to support wider points being made in articles rather than 
necessarily being the main focus. For example, an article may focus on the 
issue of corruption and the CPI maybe used to support some points being 
made.  
 
Both these types of use may represent a valid use of indicators, but it could be argued that the 
second represents a deeper embedding of the use of indictors in ways that the creators of the 
indicators intended. The first type of article is perhaps more ephemeral and represents a focus 
on indicators at their time of release. The research reported in this paper makes no distinction 
between these two types of use. However, it also needs to be remembered that the media are 
but one group of ‘consumers’, albeit an important one in terms of potential influence, and one 
could also explore use of indices such as the HDI and CPI by groups such as civil servants, 
politicians, managers etc. The literature here is very sparse indeed but is certainly one that 
deserves to grow. Lessons that can be gleaned from the use of indicators and indices will 
provide much insight for the evolution of existing indicators/indices and the creation of new 
ones. After all, there seems little point in putting much effort into the creation and 
development of indicators and indices if they are not going to be used, and media attention is 
certainly an important step to help facilitate use.  
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This research provides the first published evidence for a ‘U’ shaped relationship between 
country ranking based on HDI and CPI and media reporting and suggests that the Extremity 
Hypothesis of Heath (1996) applies to such data rather than the alternative of the Centrality 
Hypothesis. It does indeed seem to be the case that the media focusses more on those 
countries ranked at the top and the bottom of the league tables, and this is an important 
finding given that countries at these extremes can act as exemplars of what to do/not to do. 
However, this is not to say that at more regional scales the media may pick-up on differences 
between ‘peer group’ countries ranked towards the middle of the league-table. Much more 
attention needs to be given by researchers on the use of indicators and indices and what helps 
to influence it as this will help inform the further development of existing indicators/indices 
and the creation of new ones.  
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Table 1. One of the first published rankings of countries based upon income/capita where 
income has been adjusted for purchasing power (after Clark, 1940; page 54) 
 
Average yearly 
income/capita * 
 
1300 – 1400 USA, Canada 
1200 – 1300 New Zealand 
1100 – 1200  
1000 – 1100 Great Britain, Switzerland, Argentina 
900 – 1000 Australia 
800 – 900 Holland 
700 – 800 Ireland 
600 – 700 France, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Belgium, Uruguay 
500 – 600 Norway, Austria, Spain, Chile 
400 – 500 Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Iceland, Brazil 
300 – 400 Greece, Finland, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, Italy, Estonia, USSR, 
Portugal, ‘Rest of America’, Japan, Palestine, Philippines, Algeria, 
Egypt, Hawaii, Guam 
200 – 300 Bulgaria, Rumania, Lithuania, Albania, Turkey, Syria, Cyprus, South 
Africa, Morocco, Tunis 
Under 200 China, British India, Dutch Indies, ‘Rest of Asia’, ‘Rest of Africa’, 
‘Rest of Oceania’  
 
* 1925-34. Artificial monetary unit which had been adjusted for local ‘purchasing power’. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Number of countries included in the published league tables of the HDI and CPI 
between 1995 and 2014. 
 
 Number of countries in league table 
Year HDI CPI 
1995 174 42 
1996 174 54 
1997 175 52 
1998 174 85 
1999 174 99 
2000 174 90 
2001 162 91 
2002 173 102 
2003 175 133 
2004 177 146 
2005 177 159 
2006 177 163 
2007~08 179 180 (in both years) 
2009 182 180 
2010 169 178 
2011 187 183 
2012 187 176 
2013 187 177 
2014 188 175 
 
Note: only one HDI league table was published spanning 2007 and 2008. 
Data sources: Human Development Reports (1995 to 2014) and CPI league tables provided 
by Transparency International. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Results of a Principal Component Analysis on the HDI 
 PC1 PC2 
Eigenvalue 11.5 6.151 
Proportion of variation accounted for  0.605 0.324 
Cumulative proportion of variation 
accounted for 
0.605 0.929 
   
   
 
Coefficients for calculating the Principal 
Component scores 
Year of HDI publication PC1 PC2 
1995 0.257 0.101 
1996 0.271 0.121 
1997 0.265 0.142 
1998 0.257 0.159 
1999 0.075 0.371 
2000 -0.033 0.38 
2001 -0.089 0.376 
2002 -0.124 0.359 
2003 -0.164 0.325 
2004 -0.215 0.261 
2005 -0.229 0.237 
2006 -0.242 0.21 
2007~08 -0.28 0.07 
2009 -0.281 0.054 
2010 -0.271 -0.111 
2011 -0.277 -0.091 
2012 -0.274 -0.108 
2013 -0.256 -0.169 
2014 -0.25 -0.185 
 
PC1 = first principal component 
PC2 = second principal component 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Results of a Principal Component Analysis on the CPI 
 PC1 PC2 
Eigenvalue 10.864 5.53 
Proportion of variation accounted for 0.543 0.277 
Cumulative proportion of variation accounted for 0.543 0.82 
   
   
 
Coefficients for calculating the 
Principal Component scores 
Year of CPI publication PC1 PC2 
1995 0.244 -0.202 
1996 0.158 -0.268 
1997 0.241 -0.076 
1998 0.233 0.067 
1999 0.232 0.189 
2000 0.225 0.15 
2001 0.131 0.347 
2002 0.168 0.308 
2003 0.073 0.408 
2004 -0.034 0.413 
2005 -0.109 0.383 
2006 -0.216 0.254 
2007 -0.273 0.156 
2008 -0.291 0.064 
2009 -0.284 0.019 
2010 -0.275 0.019 
2011 -0.276 -0.015 
2012 -0.271 -0.057 
2013 -0.247 -0.111 
2014 -0.249 -0.103 
 
PC1 = first principal component 
PC2 = second principal component 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Mean and standard deviation of adjusted rank along with the article count over the 
period 1995 to 2014. 
 HDI CPI 
Country 
Article 
count 
Mean 
rank 
SD 
rank 
Article 
count 
Mean 
rank 
SD 
rank 
Afghanistan 877 1.94 0.03 1568 1.96 0.08 
Albania 86 1.47 0.09 990 1.65 0.12 
Algeria 352 1.54 0.07 756 1.59 0.05 
Andorra 19 1.17 0.01 5 - - 
Angola 647 1.88 0.06 1263 1.91 0.04 
Antigua and Barbuda 51 1.28 0.06 32 - - 
Argentina 235 1.21 0.03 695 1.63 0.07 
Armenia 68 1.49 0.05 966 1.63 0.10 
Australia 1671 1.02 0.03 1447 1.08 0.04 
Austria 209 1.09 0.02 758 1.14 0.09 
Azerbaijan 96 1.51 0.07 1203 1.85 0.09 
Bahamas 77 1.24 0.05 52 1.12 0.01 
Bahrain 177 1.23 0.02 805 1.25 0.04 
Bangladesh 897 1.80 0.03 1168 1.88 0.11 
Barbados 149 1.19 0.05 238 1.11 0.03 
Belarus 108 1.33 0.04 1035 1.66 0.17 
Belgium 463 1.06 0.03 644 1.19 0.13 
Belize 59 1.43 0.10 64 1.45 0.10 
Benin 301 1.89 0.03 624 1.57 0.08 
Bhutan 274 1.79 0.07 558 1.21 0.04 
Bolivia 164 1.63 0.03 399 1.72 0.13 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 86 1.40 0.03 989 1.50 0.06 
Botswana 453 1.63 0.10 1281 1.21 0.04 
Brazil 831 1.40 0.04 1058 1.48 0.14 
Brunei Darussalam 83 1.18 0.03 238 1.23 0.02 
Bulgaria 125 1.33 0.03 1245 1.45 0.11 
Burkina Faso 627 1.98 0.01 642 1.51 0.08 
Burundi 465 1.97 0.01 486 1.88 0.08 
Cambodia 236 1.77 0.05 690 1.89 0.03 
Cameroon 302 1.79 0.03 1081 1.86 0.08 
Canada 2169 1.02 0.02 1478 1.06 0.02 
Cape Verde 147 1.64 0.05 658 1.24 0.02 
Central African Republic 335 1.94 0.05 234 1.85 0.03 
Chad 568 1.96 0.02 797 1.95 0.03 
Chile 362 1.21 0.02 724 1.18 0.09 
China 2406 1.54 0.05 3719 1.56 0.17 
Colombia 211 1.40 0.07 602 1.56 0.19 
Comoros 64 1.80 0.04 34 1.77 0.06 
Congo 693 1.76 0.03 584 1.85 0.03 
Congo (Democratic Republic of the) 654 1.92 0.07 541 1.92 0.02 
Costa Rica 226 1.27 0.07 406 1.31 0.06 
Côte d'Ivoire 272 1.89 0.03 719 1.81 0.09 
Croatia 94 1.28 0.06 1175 1.43 0.11 
Cuba 277 1.33 0.08 292 1.36 0.03 
Cyprus 113 1.15 0.02 765 1.19 0.03 
Czech Republic 143 1.18 0.03 1370 1.36 0.09 
Denmark 494 1.08 0.02 1647 1.01 0.01 
Djibouti 125 1.88 0.03 79 1.56 0.04 
Dominica 36 1.38 0.09 29 1.23 0.04 
Dominican Republic 108 1.52 0.02 422 1.61 0.07 
Ecuador 123 1.46 0.06 437 1.78 0.09 
Egypt 597 1.64 0.04 1219 1.60 0.09 
El Salvador 122 1.60 0.04 352 1.45 0.09 
Equatorial Guinea 242 1.71 0.06 480 1.94 0.01 
Eritrea 200 1.93 0.04 323 1.74 0.12 
Estonia 133 1.25 0.08 1078 1.20 0.06 
Ethiopia 697 1.96 0.02 911 1.69 0.08 
Fiji 94 1.43 0.11 45 - - 
Finland 438 1.07 0.03 1355 1.01 0.02 
France 1450 1.07 0.03 1704 1.19 0.09 
Gabon 220 1.64 0.06 420 1.55 0.04 
Gambia 246 1.91 0.03 132 1.66 0.13 
Georgia 129 1.49 0.07 1134 1.55 0.26 
Germany 971 1.08 0.03 2775 1.13 0.07 
Ghana 739 1.75 0.03 1221 1.45 0.11 
Greece 261 1.13 0.02 1432 1.42 0.10 
Grenada 49 1.40 0.08 30 1.42 0.03 
Guatemala 153 1.67 0.02 379 1.67 0.10 
Guinea 1060 1.93 0.02 994 1.91 0.05 
Guinea-Bissau 315 1.95 0.02 97 1.88 0.04 
Guyana 71 1.60 0.03 372 1.72 0.04 
Haiti 341 1.86 0.02 671 1.95 0.05 
Honduras 122 1.66 0.02 454 1.77 0.08 
Hong Kong 432 1.12 0.03 1189 1.14 0.10 
Hungary 142 1.23 0.03 1298 1.33 0.12 
Iceland 578 1.04 0.03 506 1.04 0.02 
India 3343 1.73 0.03 2576 1.62 0.15 
Indonesia 632 1.61 0.03 1499 1.81 0.15 
Iran 438 1.48 0.08 1241 1.72 0.12 
Iraq 542 1.68 0.05 1487 1.95 0.05 
Ireland 669 1.06 0.03 511 1.14 0.05 
Israel 416 1.12 0.02 1067 1.19 0.03 
Italy 541 1.11 0.01 1623 1.39 0.14 
Jamaica 111 1.49 0.04 419 1.48 0.05 
Japan 1330 1.05 0.02 1925 1.18 0.11 
Jordan 191 1.49 0.05 931 1.34 0.09 
Kazakhstan 133 1.42 0.06 1184 1.74 0.09 
Kenya 790 1.79 0.04 1551 1.87 0.05 
Kiribati 16 1.68 0.04 24 1.53 0.05 
Korea (Republic of) 53 1.14 0.04 20 1.36 0.15 
Korea (Democratic Republic of) 2 1.45 0.03 4 2.00 0.00 
Kosovo 76 - - 334 1.62 0.01 
Kuwait 225 1.25 0.05 832 1.33 0.05 
Kyrgyzstan 75 1.61 0.05 922 1.87 0.04 
Lao PDR 196 1.77 0.03 628 1.81 0.13 
Latvia 126 1.31 0.09 1032 1.41 0.17 
Lebanon 197 1.43 0.06 919 1.64 0.12 
Lesotho 198 1.80 0.05 401 1.42 0.07 
Liberia 666 1.94 0.03 545 1.60 0.17 
Libya 421 1.35 0.05 962 1.81 0.11 
Liechtenstein 76 1.07 0.04 103 - - 
Lithuania 122 1.29 0.09 1052 1.31 0.08 
Luxembourg 259 1.10 0.04 327 1.10 0.09 
Macau 36 - - 30 1.22 0.04 
Macedonia 66 1.40 0.04 977 1.50 0.15 
Madagascar 125 1.83 0.03 389 1.63 0.13 
Malawi 370 1.92 0.02 418 1.57 0.08 
Malaysia 597 1.33 0.01 1349 1.34 0.10 
Maldives 154 1.55 0.06 457 1.67 0.13 
Mali 635 1.96 0.02 719 1.61 0.06 
Malta 73 1.18 0.02 76 1.21 0.04 
Mauritania 166 1.85 0.02 636 1.69 0.08 
Mauritius 319 1.37 0.04 540 1.31 0.07 
Mexico 480 1.31 0.03 780 1.56 0.13 
Micronesia  20 1.63 0.02 7 - - 
Moldova 66 1.60 0.04 1012 1.65 0.12 
Mongolia 132 1.62 0.06 833 1.56 0.08 
Montenegro 42 1.30 0.04 899 1.41 0.04 
Morocco 286 1.70 0.02 808 1.48 0.05 
Mozambique 650 1.96 0.01 909 1.67 0.08 
Myanmar 222 1.76 0.03 836 1.97 0.04 
Namibia 343 1.67 0.03 1011 1.32 0.02 
Nepal 603 1.82 0.04 717 1.74 0.07 
Netherlands 747 1.03 0.01 1255 1.07 0.04 
New Zealand 598 1.08 0.04 1910 1.01 0.02 
Nicaragua 138 1.67 0.03 413 1.72 0.05 
Niger 1456 1.99 0.01 821 1.70 0.10 
Nigeria 2088 1.84 0.03 2380 1.89 0.11 
Norway 1596 1.01 0.01 828 1.07 0.05 
Palestine 83 1.58 0.02 35 1.67 0.08 
Oman 191 1.41 0.08 808 1.26 0.07 
Pakistan 1826 1.78 0.02 1691 1.82 0.09 
Palau 13 1.29 0.03 2 - - 
Panama 108 1.31 0.03 393 1.50 0.07 
Papua New Guinea 214 1.78 0.04 141 1.84 0.05 
Paraguay 82 1.52 0.04 435 1.87 0.09 
Peru 182 1.46 0.04 474 1.44 0.03 
Philippines 402 1.53 0.07 1033 1.70 0.10 
Poland 187 1.23 0.04 1413 1.37 0.11 
Portugal 350 1.18 0.03 474 1.23 0.10 
Puerto Rico 22 - - 160 1.19 0.01 
Qatar 224 1.24 0.05 929 1.17 0.05 
Romania 132 1.36 0.07 1363 1.54 0.15 
Russian Federation 900 1.35 0.04 3036 1.80 0.09 
Rwanda 566 1.91 0.04 712 1.44 0.17 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 26 1.30 0.06 4 - -- 
Saint Lucia 23 1.42 0.06 34 1.12 0.01 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 18 1.46 0.06 43 1.17 0.02 
Samoa 70 1.51 0.07 40 1.33 0.03 
Sao Tome and Principe 57 1.73 0.03 312 1.54 0.11 
Saudi Arabia 377 1.36 0.08 1058 1.38 0.07 
Senegal 433 1.88 0.03 704 1.54 0.09 
Serbia 59 1.36 0.03 1060 1.52 0.12 
Seychelles 138 1.30 0.05 189 1.30 0.04 
Sierra Leone 1409 1.99 0.02 910 1.78 0.07 
Singapore 833 1.13 0.04 2087 1.04 0.04 
Slovakia 106 1.21 0.02 1159 1.39 0.11 
Slovenia 125 1.15 0.03 1089 1.21 0.06 
Solomon Islands 0 1.73 0.05 50 1.62 0.02 
Somalia 415 1.97 0.02 1253 1.99 0.03 
South Africa 1586 1.62 0.06 1952 1.36 0.09 
South Sudan 152 1.90 - 166 1.99 0.00 
Spain 439 1.10 0.03 985 1.24 0.14 
Sri Lanka 484 1.51 0.05 707 1.50 0.03 
Sudan 668 1.85 0.05 1310 1.94 0.06 
Suriname 45 1.46 0.07 89 1.47 0.08 
Swaziland 208 1.73 0.06 247 1.51 0.11 
Sweden 912 1.04 0.02 982 1.03 0.02 
Switzerland 643 1.06 0.02 1081 1.07 0.05 
Syria 244 1.59 0.07 1000 1.70 0.17 
Taiwan 276 - - 838 1.28 0.13 
Tajikistan 93 1.66 0.03 948 1.88 0.03 
Tanzania 581 1.86 0.04 1155 1.68 0.14 
Thailand 513 1.43 0.07 1197 1.56 0.13 
Timor-Leste 142 1.79 0.08 54 1.73 0.06 
Togo 208 1.83 0.03 617 1.73 0.06 
Tonga 53 1.45 0.09 42 1.67 0.20 
Trinidad and Tobago 102 1.30 0.05 418 1.41 0.06 
Tunisia 355 1.51 0.04 889 1.36 0.06 
Turkey 328 1.46 0.05 2185 1.47 0.15 
Turkmenistan 77 1.54 0.04 1019 1.94 0.04 
Uganda 707 1.87 0.03 1279 1.78 0.10 
Ukraine 199 1.45 0.06 1516 1.79 0.09 
United Arab Emirates 255 1.23 0.04 748 1.18 0.04 
United Kingdom 1133 1.09 0.03 1574 1.11 0.06 
USA 3726 1.03 0.02 3588 1.15 0.07 
Uruguay 137 1.24 0.03 424 1.24 0.16 
Uzbekistan 90 1.60 0.04 1037 1.89 0.10 
Vanuatu 67 1.69 0.03 13 1.50 0.08 
Venezuala 0 1.35 0.06 1 1.85 0.08 
Viet Nam 85 1.65 0.03 193 1.73 0.08 
Yemen 250 1.83 0.03 880 1.80 0.11 
Yugoslavia 62 - - 176 1.87 0.14 
Zambia 503 1.86 0.06 1039 1.62 0.10 
Zimbabwe 704 1.80 0.09 1299 1.76 0.14 
 
- Could not be calculated 
 
Figure 1. Two hypotheses suggested by Heath (1996) regarding the extremity dimension of news. 
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(a) The Centrality Hypothesis (b) The Extremity Hypothesis
Figure 2. Relationship between the 1st and 2nd Principal component scores of the HDI and CPI and the mean rank for countries. 
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Figure 3.  Relationship between the 1st and 2nd Principal Component scores of the HDI and CPI. The PCs were derived from country league table 
ranks between 1995 and 2014, 
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Predictor Coefficient (SE) t-value
Constant 0.5163 (0.1753) 2.94**
CPI PC1 -0.9478 (0.0748) -12.68***
CPI PC12 -0.152 (0.0356) -4.27***
Predictor Coefficient (SE) t-value
Constant -0.4293 (0.1392) -3.08**
CPI PC1 0.788 (0.0593) 13.28***
CPI PC12 0.1206 (0.0282) 4.27***
Predictor Coefficient (SE) t-value
Constant 0.417 (0.1504) 2.77**
CPI PC1 0.901 (0.0678) 13.29***
CPI PC12 -0.1402 (0.0323) -4.34***
Predictor Coefficient (SE) t-value
Constant -0.3796 (0.1285) -2.95**
CPI PC1 -0.6876 (0.0579) -11.87***
CPI PC12 0.1206 (0.0276) 4.36***
A B
C D
N = 184
R2 = 49.5%
F = 90.72***
N = 184
R2 = 48.9%
F = 88.42***
N = 184
R2 = 47.0%
F = 82.21***
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Figure 4. Relationship between the total number of media articles published between 1995 and 2014 for countries mentioning the HDI and CPI 
and their 1st and 2nd PC scores. 
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Predictor Coefficient (SE) t-value
Constant 207.28 (53.16) 3.9***
HDI PC1 1.85 (19.47) 0.09 ns
HDI PC12 59.91 (11.32) 5.29***
Predictor Coefficient (SE) t-value
Constant 180.1 (49.25) 3.66***
HDI PC2 -4.63 (15.3) -0.3 ns
HDI PC22 45.14 (6.74) 6.7***
Predictor Coefficient (SE) t-value
Constant 769.23 (64.54) 11.92***
CPI PC1 65.02 (27.45) 2.37*
CPI PC12 22.13 (13.14) 1.68 ns
A B
C D
N = 190
R2 = 12.1%
F = 14.03***
N = 190
R2 = 18.5%
F = 22.49***
N = 189
R2 = 2.1%
F = 3.02 (P=0.051)
N = 189
R2 = 12.3%
F = 14.21***
Predictor Coefficient (SE) t-value
Constant 666.35 (55.62) 11.98***
CPI PC2 -21.22 (25.4) -0.84 ns
CPI PC22 61.72 (12.09) 5.1***
